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THE DEATH ON THE HIGH SEAS ACT: TWO REMAINING
PROBLEMS
The common law of England and in this country had no right
of action for death .... [T~his was remedied by Lord Campbell's
act and following it our States have passed statutes conferring
certain remedies for death .... On the Continent of Europe a
recovery may be had for death ... and [tjhere is no reason why
the admiralty law of the United States should longer depend on
the statute laws of the States and lag behind the general laws of
Europe. Congress can now bring our law into line with the laws
of those enlightened nations which confer a right of action for
death at sea.'
Thus the Honorable Harrington Putnam of the Supreme Court
of the State of New York urged passage of the bill that was to
become known as the Death on the High Seas Act.'
Although DOHSA was passed into law in 1920, a reevaluation of
its provisions has been prompted by the United States Supreme
Court's recognition of a general maritime action for wrongful death'
and by the growing number of American-based companies which
own or operate oil wells within the territorial waters of foreign na-
tions. This comment attempts to provide insight' into the applica-
bility of DOHSA within foreign territorial waters and its possible
supplementation by foreign law and general maritime law.
The Use of Section 4 of DOHSA to Supplement Recovery Under
Section 1
Section 1 of DOHSA5 recognizes a cause of action for death
caused by a wrongful act occurring on the high seas; section 2
1. S. REP. No. 216, 66th Cong., 1st Sess. 7590, 2-4 (1919) [hereinafter cited as S.
REP. No. 2161.
2. 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-66 (1976).
3. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
4. It should be noted at the outset that this comment will not broach the subject
of choice of law and DOHSA, but will treat only the more limited situation when,
under the application of choice of law principles, DOHSA would apply and a remedy
exists under foreign law. For a discussion of choice of law, see Watson, Applicable
Law In Suits By Foreign Offshore Oil Workers, 41 LA. L. REv. 827 (1981).
5. Sections 761, 762, and 764 of DOHSA are referred to as sections 1, 2, and 4
respectively. Section 1 reads:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect, or
default occurring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the shore of any
State, or the District of Columbia or the Territories or dependencies of the
United States, the personal representative of the decedent may maintain a suit
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specifies the recovery allowed and limitations of that cause of ac-
tion. Section 4 is different, in that it does not expound on the
established cause of action. Rather, it recognizes that whenever "a
right of action is granted by the law of a foreign State, . . . such
right may be maintained . . . in the courts of the United States,
without abatement in respect to the amount for which recovery is
authorized . . . ."I The placement of this provision in DOHSA has
generated speculation that the recovery authorized by sections 1
and 2 might be supplemented by foreign law, thus expanding
recovery. Such speculation has become even more inviting since the
Supreme Court, through its decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higgin-
botham,' closed the door on possible supplementation of DOHSA by
general maritime law or state law.
Although jurisprudence in this area is far from definitive, three
cases are generally cited for the proposition that sections 1 and 4
can be maintained concurrently.' The Presidente Wilson," a 1929
case dealing with the deaths of American citizens on an American
ship involved in a collision with the Italian Presidente Wilson, sum-
marily stated that damages for death were recoverable under Italian
law and thus the case was within the provisions, of both section 1
and section 4; no authority for this proposition was cited, nor was
any consideration given as to why both sections should apply."
for damages in the district courts of the United States, in admiralty, for the exclu-
sive benefit of the decedent's wife, husband, parent, child, or dependent relative
against the vessel, person, or corporation which would have been liable if death
had not ensued.
46 U.S.C. § 761 (1976).
6. Section 2 provides:
The recovery in such suit shall be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary
loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought and shall be
apportioned among them by the court in proportion to the loss they may severally
have suffered by reason of the death of the person by whose representative the
suit is brought.
46 U.S.C § 762 (1976).
7. Section 4 provides:
Whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any foreign State on account
of death by wrongful act, neglect, or default, occurring upon the high seas, such
right may be maintained in an appropriate action in Admiralty in the courts of
the United States, without abatement in respect to the amount for which
recovery is authorized, any statute of the United States to the contrary not-
withstanding.
46 U.S.C. § 764 (1976).
8. Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618 (1978).
9. Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957);
Iafrate v. Compagnie Generale Transatlantique, 106 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1952); The
Presidente Wilson, 30 F.2d 466 (D. Mass. 1929).
10. 30 F.2d 466 (D. Mass. 1929).
11. Id.
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In Iafrate v. Compagine Generale Transatlantique," a federal
district court dismissed a claim based upon French law as insuffi-
ciently pleaded and sustained a libel under section 1 of DOHSA,
although the death occurred aboard a French vessel. The court did
not hold expressly that concurrent actions would be allowed,
although from the opinion it might be inferred that a cause of action
under section 1 was present and that, had libellant pleaded foreign
law with greater particularity, an additional cause of action under
section 4 would have existed.
A decision which perhaps more directly addressed the issue was
Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana.'3 In Fernandez the
libelants, as administrators of the estate of a stewardess killed in
the crash of a Venezuelan airliner thirty miles off the coast of New
Jersey, brought a libel for wrongful death against the Venezuelan
airline based on section 1 of DOHSA. Respondents moved to dismiss
for failure to state a claim under section 1, urging that only section
4 is applicable when death occurs on a foreign vessel outside United
States territorial waters. The court dismissed the motion and indi-
cated that cumulative causes of action can be maintained as to
American deaths on foreign vessels." However, the applicable
foreign law did not supply a cause of action for wrongful death and,
had the court found section 1 inapplicable, the plaintiffs might have
been denied a remedy; absent this concern a different result might
have been reached.
Such is the interpretation given Fernandez by the court in
Bergeron v. Koninkijke Luchtvaart Maatschappij, N. V.'5 Bergeron
held that concurrent causes of action under sections 1 and 4 are not
maintainable and noted that "there is no warrant in the statutory
language or policy for the maintenance of concurrent causes of ac-
tion under both American law (section 1) and foreign law (section
4)."" Bergeron includes a review of the then-existing jurisprudence
12. 106 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y. 1952).
13. 156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957).
14. In order to determine whether sections 1 and 4 are mutually exclusive, the
court defined DOHSA as conferring a "power" rather than a "right," distinguishing the
two situations by proclaiming that a "right" depends upon whether a wrong was com-
mitted, which in turn depends upon where the wrong was committed. "Power" depends
upon the forum which exercises the power, and the right within the power depends upon
the locus of the accident. The remainder of the decision is no clearer than the above men-
tioned "distinction"; the resulting decision is not in accord with prior law.
Note, Admiralty-Federal Legislation. In General-Section 1 of Death on High Seas
Act gives cause of action for death occurring in crash of foreign airplane on High
seas-Fernandez v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 71 HARV. L. REV. 1152, 1153 (1958).
15. 188 F. Supp. 594 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
16. Id.
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dealing with the question. In The Vestris7 the court explicitly held
that an option did not exist as between section 1 and section 4 and
required the claimants to bring their action under section 4. In The
Vulcania"8 decision, a New York district court sustained a libel
brought under section 1, even though a foreign vessel was involved,
because foreign law had not been pleaded sufficiently; once foreign
law was sufficiently pleaded, the court dismissed the section 1
claim, 9 refusing to allow both actions to stand concurrently.
The same airplane crash that gave rise to the Fernandez litiga-
tion led to a series of decisions by federal courts in Delaware and
New Jersey. Of these, Noel v. Airoponents Inc."° was correctly inter-
preted by the court in Bergeron2 as not having held that cumulative
remedies were available. Instead, the tenor of the Noel opinion in-
dicates that the court was attempting to find one applicable body of
law."
Out of the same crash and subsequent series of decisions emerged
Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana23 which included broad
language stating that only one cause of action exists for wrongful
death, whether grounded in section 1 or section 4.4 Because
Venezuelan law allowed elements of damage for conscious pain and
suffering and mental distress not allowed under- Section 2 of
DOHSA, libelants were permitted to assert their claims for those
damages as well. The Noel court qualified its broad language and ex-
panded recovery by citing, in a footnote, 5 Bergeron and its holding
that concurrent causes of actions under sections 1 and 4 are not
maintainable. The court also referred to an earlier footnote26 in
which the Noel court had assumed that the question surrounding
sections 1 and 4 was not settled authoritatively, contrasting
Bergeron and its line of cases with Fernandez and Irafrate. The foot-
notes in Noel v. Linea Aeropostale would seem to suggest that,
although concurrent causes of action are not maintainable, additional
damages may be obtained, even though not authorized under
DOHSA, if they are available under applicable foreign law. Because
such an expanded recovery is exactly the one inventive plaintiffs' at-
17. 53 F.2d 847 (S.D.N.Y. 1931).
18. 32 F. Supp. 815 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
19. 188 F. Supp. 594, 595 (S.D.N.Y. 1940).
20. 169 F. Supp. 348 (D.N.J. 1958).
21. 188 F. Supp. at 596-97.
22. Id. at 596.
23. 260 F. Supp. 1002 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
24. Id. at 1006.
25. Id. at n.24.
26. Id. at 1005 n.18.
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torneys desire, it is likely that this later Noel decision will be cited
and urged as authority for the proposition that section 4 and foreign
remedies can be used to supplement section 1.27
The legislative history of DOHSA is helpful in determining
whether this result was intended by Congress. The original drafts of
the bill that was to become DOHSA did not contain the language today
recognized as section 4. It was not until Mr. Kellogg's 8 report to the
Senate, dated September 23, 1919,9 that such an amendment was
proposed." The amendment was considered necessary by Mr.
Kellogg because a "review of authorities" did not indicate that Con-
gress had "the power to create a substantive right of action to
recover damages against foreigners and their vessels for wrongful
death on the high seas."'" He explained that the bill was "particularly
designed to provide a law of the forum for American courts ... and
a law of the flag for American vessels." 2 Nonetheless, he felt that
an action clearly would lie in the United States courts when the
foreign country of the vessel granted a right of action for
negligence. Notwithstanding the fact that a foreign vessel was in-
volved, the Supreme Court had "held that the limited liability
statute" of the United States applied to foreign ships seeking such
limitation of liability in American courts." As a result, the com-
mittee recommended the passage of the amendment which is now
section 4. Hence, it is submitted that, by recommending the addition
of section 4, the committee intended to change recovery under
DOHSA only with respect to limitation of liability. Robert Hughes of
the Virginia Bar, who was involved extensively in the drafting of
the original bill, called section 4 "superfluous," as it was "apparently
added for the purpose of giving our courts the power to enforce
such a right of action arising under a foreign law against a foreign
vessel ... for it is an elementary doctrine of marine law that an ad-
miralty claim against a ship can be enforced against her, wherever
27. This result could be supported by analogy to the present status of recovery
under workers' compensation. In workers' compensation, recovery under one state's
statute does not preclude supplemental recovery under another state's workers' com-
pensation statute. The argument is that the original recovery is only a basic remedy
which can be supplemented unless expressly prohibited by the granting statute. W.
MALONE & H. JOHNSON, WORKERS' COMPENSATION LAW AND PRACTICE § 409, in 13 LouI-
SIANA CIVIL LAW TREATISE 329-31 (1980).
28. Mr. Kellogg was a member of the Committee on the Judiciary who submitted
his report on DOHSA to the Senate.
29. S. REP. No. 216, supra note 1, at 1.
30. Id. at 5.
31. Id. at 4.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 4-5.
34. Id.
1218 [Vol. 41
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she may be found." 5 The intended purpose of section 4 would ap-
pear to have been to deny limitation of liability to claimants urging
foreign law in United States courts. If this was not the intent of
Congress, then the argument has been made that section 4 is
superfluous and should have no effect upon the limitation of
recovery under section 1.36
The Applicability of DOHSA Within Foreign Territorial Waters
The question of DOHSA's applicability within foreign territorial
waters is one of practical importance as a result of the growing
number of United States-based oil companies operating submersible
and semisubmersible rigs within foreign territorial waters. The
Supreme Court in Moragne3" recognized the existence of a maritime
common law which is preempted only when it conflicts with express
statutory provisions. This general maritime law action, which grants
a broader recovery than that allowed under DOHSA, would be a
more inviting alternative to plaintiffs than DOHSA if DOHSA were
found not to be applicable within foreign territorial waters. Alter-
natively, expanded recovery beyond that offered by DOHSA might
be found under applicable foreign law. The arguments against
DOHSA's applicability are strengthened by the ambiguous language
of the Act itself and by the accepted adage in maritime law that it is
preferable "to give than to withold the remedy";" if a person were
entitled to an expanded recovery under general common law or ap-
plicable foreign law, arguably a strained reading of DOHSA should
not be found to foreclose such recoveries.
Case law dealing with DOHSA's applicability within foreign
territorial waters is limited and flawed. Three cases 9 have dealt
with the question, and the later two cite the first as authority for
the proposition that DOHSA is applicable within foreign territorial
waters.
In Roberts v. United States,0 the first case to deal with the
problem, the court expressly refused to rule on the question. 1
Nonetheless, Roberts is cited in later decisions as authority for the
proposition that DOHSA is applicable within the territorial waters
35. Hughes, Death Actions in Admiralty, 31 YALE L.J, 115, 118 (1921).
36. 46 U.S.C. § 762 (1976).
37. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
38. See note 67, infra.
39. Roberts v. United States, 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974); Mancuso v. Kimex, Inc.,
484 F. Supp. 453 (S.D. Fla. 1980); Cormier v. Williams/Sedco/Horn, 460 F. Supp. 1010
(E.D. La. 1978).
40. 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974).
41. Id. at 524.
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of foreign countries. The cited language comes not from the text of
the Roberts opinion, wherein the court casts grave doubt upon the
act's applicability, 2 but rather from a footnote" in which the court,
without citing any authority, supposes that "because Congress only
has power to fix the extent of territorial waters measured from the
shore of its own country it may. well have considered all waters
beyond one marine league . . . to be 'high seas' for purposes of
DOHSA . . . even though within territorial waters of a foreign
state."" It is submitted that this supposition, although not entirely
without merit, is invalid upon reflection. If one accepts the proposi-
tion that Congress's power to determine its territorial waters is
limited to the shores of its own country, then it should follow that
Congress has no power to establish substantive law within the terri-
torial waters of a foreign sovereign. However, the original supposi-
tion itself is questionable, because Congress's power to determine
admiralty jurisdiction is not limited by the United States Constitu-
tion to its own shores. Only the doctrines of international law work
to limit admiralty jurisdiction, and these doctrines urge mutual
respect of sovereigns and their territories. In support of this argu-
ment it has been urged that, given the established concepts of inter-
national law in the 1900's, the broad language of section 1 should not
be taken literally to mean that the statute is applicable to all deaths
beyond three miles from the United States wherever occurring;
rather, it should be "construed to apply only to areas and trans-
actions in which American law would be considered operative under
prevalent doctrines of international law." 5
Additionally, the court in the Roberts decisions does not
distinguish among the different types of jurisdiction and thereby
commits an error in the reasoning urged. For present purposes, ad-
miralty jurisdiction can be said to have three different meanings.
First, jurisdiction can be the court's power to adjudicate as to a par-
ticular defendant. Second, jurisdiction can be the power of the
sovereign to apply a substantive law to a given controversy; and,
third, jurisdiction can mean the court's power to hear a matter in
admiralty. The latter two types of jurisdiction are not recognized as
42. Id.
43. Id. at 524 n.7.
44. Id.
45. Note, supra note 14, at 1154. See Cheatham & Reese, Choice of Applicable
Law, 52 COLUM L. REV. 959, 961 (1952). See also Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 577
(1953); The Queen v. Jameson, [18691 2 Q.B. 425, 430.
Also, at the time DOHSA was enacted, Congress viewed international law as
precluding even the assertion of an American wrongful death action against a ship of
foreign flag under the belief that this would infringe on the foreign nation's sovereignty.
S. REP. No. 216, supra note 1; Hughes, supra note 34.
1220 [Vol. 41
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separate and independent by the Roberts decision. This error is il-
lustrated when the court cites a commentator" who suggests that
the scope of DOHSA is the same as "general admiralty
jurisdiction."'7 Because general admiralty jurisdiction -the court's
power to hear a matter in admiralty-extends beyond the United
States shores and into foreign territorial waters, it does not
necessarily follow that a statute establishing substantive law is
thereby intended to have application within the entire scope of that
jurisdiction.' 8 The question at issue is what Congress meant by the
phrase "high seas," rather than what the scope of general admiralty
jurisdiction might be.
Existing case law interpreting the phrase "high seas" illustrates
the necessity for determining the context in which the phrase is used
in order to establish its meaning. 9 The phrase, as used in DOHSA,
reflects the accepted concepts of international law in the late 1800's
and early 1900's and Congress's intent to provide a cause of action
when death results from a wrongful act occurring on the high seas."°
The accepted doctrines of international law of that period included
an understanding of the mutual respect among sovereigns as to
their territories and territorial waters. The United States Supreme
Court in The Scotia" illustrated this understanding of the interna-
tional law of the sea in 1872 when the Court announced that the
"law of the sea is of universal obligation and no single nation, and
certainly not a single State, should be allowed to create obligations
for the world." One contemporary writer,52 citing The Scotia, also
recognized the existing foreign causes of action and'the United
46. Ball, Wrongful Death at Sea-The Death on the High Seas Act, 51 CAL. L.
REV. 389, 397 (1963).
47. 498 F.2d at 525 n.7.
48. Although maritime jurisdiction extends beyond the shores of the United
States, the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act by its terms does
not..
49. United States v. Flores, 289 U.S. 137 (1933); United States.v. Rodgers, 150 U.S.
249 (1893); United States v. Ross, 439 F.2d 1355 (9th Cir. 1971).
50. 59 CONG. REC. 4482, 4482 (1920) (remarks of Mr. Volstead). As the author of
the bill in the House of Representatives, Volstead noted that all major European
countries and England recognized a cause of action when death resulted and that the
purpose of the Act was to provide a remedy where none existed. His understanding of
the bill's purpose and his recognition that such causes of action existed within waters
controlled by the states and within waters where foreign law would apply tends to
support the proposition that DOHSA was intended to apply only to those remaining
waters where no cause of action would exist in United States courts. See Whitelock,
A New Development in The Application of Extra-Territorial Law to Extra-Territorial
Marine Torts, 22 HARv. L. REv. 403 (1909) (a summation of existing causes of action).
51. 81 U.S. 170 (14 Wall.) (1872).
52. Whitelock, supra note 50, at 415.
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States courts' deference to such causes of action in the early
-1900's.53 The Senate report" on DOHSA stated that, with the proposed
legislation, "Congress can now bring our maritime law into line with
the laws of those enlightened nations which confer a right of action
for death at sea. 55 The authorities of the period recognized that all
civilized nations other than the United States had recognized the
necessary cause of action for death resulting from acts on the high
seas and, consequently, that the United States should provide such a
cause of action for its courts. There is no indication that the United
States remedy was intended to usurp the already existing foreign
causes of action arising within a foreign sovereign's territorial
waters. Given the tenor of the scholarly authority and case law
cited, the better argument would seem to be that Congress intended
only to supply a cause of action where none existed and, therefore,
53. In addition, Robert M. Hughes of the Virginia Bar was involved in writing the
original drafts of DOHSA. He cited case law in which the United States courts had
recognized foreign substantive law in death actions even before DOHSA and urged
that an act of Congress should not be held to affect the conduct of foreign ships on the
high seas, because the then-accepted choice of law doctrine of law of the flag should
operate in order to equalize the exercise of power among sovereigns. Note, Recovery
from Airlines Under the Death on the High Seas Act: A Conflict Rule Suggested, 67
YALE L.J. 1445 (1958).
54. S. REP. No. 741, 64th Cong., 1st Sess. 6899 (1916) [hereinafter cited as S. REP.
No. 741].
55. Id. at 4. In the same report, Mr. George W. Whitelock, on behalf of the
American Bar Association, declared that each nation has the right to declare the laws
which will be applicable to the sea in its courts and that every country of Europe had
declared a cause of action to exist for wrongful death on the seas and that American
courts should be given the "very same" right of recovery.
Each nation may declare what it will accept, and by its courts enforce, as laws of
the sea, when parties choose to resort to its forum for redress.... Every country
of western Europe is believed to recognize the right of recovery for death ... and
assuredly there is no hardship in giving in American courts the very same right
of recovery to withhold a foreign defendant and his ship would be liable under the
law of the vessel's home port.
S. REP. No. 741, supra note 53, at 4-5, quoting The Scotland, 105 U.S. 24 (1851). Mr.
Fitz-Henry Smith, Jr., writing on behalf of the Maritime Law Association in the
Senate Report, S. REP. No. 216, supra note 1, at 1-2, reprinted in H. REP. No. 674, 66th
Cong. 2d Sess. 7653 (1920), pointed out that although jurisdiction of the admiralty
courts of the United States extends over the high seas and all navigable waters,
maritime law can have the effect of law in a given country only to the extent permit-
ted and recognized. And although the maritime law of nations had a common origin,
there is no such thing as a code of maritime law practiced by all nations except that
which is adopted and used by such nations. He also urged that the United States
courts were not bound to exercise jurisdiction over all controversies which fall within
its maritime jurisdiction and, in fact, should not always do so, citing The Scotland, 105
U.S. 24 (1881), as authority for the proposition that courts should sometimes refrain
from exercising their broad jurisdictional powers in deference to the independent
sovereignty of nations.
[V/ol. 411222
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did not, with its use of the term "high seas," contemplate that the
territorial waters of foreign nations would be included within the
scope of the proposed substantive law.
The second case which addressed the question of DOHSA's
applicability within foreign territorial waters was Cormier v.
Williams/Sedco/Horn,6 wherein Judge Cassibry determined that
DOHSA does apply within foreign territorial waters. The rationale
used is based upon dicta taken from Moragne v. States Marine
Lines, Inc.57 urging that Congress passed DOHSA to provide "a cor-
responding remedy for deaths occurring outside the reach of state
/aw.''58
To cite dicta from Moragne for the proposition that DOHSA was
intended to apply outside the reach of state law ad infinitum ignores
the presence of the maritime law of foreign sovereigns which existed
and was recognized by the initiators of DOHSA in 1920 when DOHSA
was debated and passed into law. One cannot ignore the accepted
belief in the 1900's that, in maritime matters, no one "country
should be able to create obligations for another." 9 The understand-
ing of international law accepted during the era was that each
sovereign created the laws applicable within its territory and other
sovereigns respected this exercise of power.
In addition to relying upon dicta from Moragane, the Cormier
decision notes that the statutory language of DOHSA includes all
waters beyond three miles from the shores of a state.0 The true
issue is whether Congress, through the language used, intended to
legislate substantive law not only for the seas beyond three miles
from a state, but also for all foreign territorial waters generally
regarded in the 1900's as being under the legislative power of the
foreign sovereign. To state that the language on its face includes
foreign territorial waters is to avoid the true question. No further
authority is given in Cormier other than the Roberts footnote"
which has already been discussed. It is submitted that Cormier
offers no new authority for the proposition its holding urges.
Mancuso v. Kimes, Inc.,62 the last of the cases dealing with the
question, cites only Roberts and Cormier for its holding that the
court "has proper jurisdiction under DOHSA"' 3 within foreign terri-
56. 460 F. Supp. 1010, 1011 (E.D. La. 1978).
57. 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
58. 460 F. Supp. at 1011.
59. The Scotia, 81 U.S. 170 (14 Wall.) (1872). See Whitelock, supra note 47, at 415.
60. 460 F. Supp. at 1011.
61. Id. at 1012.
62. 484 F. Supp. 453 (S.D. Fla. 1980).
63. 484 F. Supp. at 455.
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torial waters. Mancuso is to be distinguished, as the issue was
couched in terms of admiralty jurisdiction rather than in terms of
the scope of DOHSA independent of such jurisdiction. The inquiry in
Mancuso should be whether DOHSA, as substantive law, is appli-
cable within foreign territorial waters; the case does not distinguish
the two questions. 4 No authority is cited to uphold the court's ruling
that DOHSA is applicable within foreign territorial waters other
than the Roberts and Cormier decisions. It becomes strikingly clear
that a flaw in a law review article65 bred dicta in Roberts which
reflected and compounded an error which has been cited as authority
for the 1978 Cormier decision and for the 1980 Mancuso decision.
While additional jurisprudence is lacking on the question and no
definitive answer has been given, in light of the legislative history
and the status of international law in the early 1900's, it is urged
that the better argument is that DOHSA should not apply within
foreign territorial waters.
If one accepts that DOHSA is not applicable within foreign terri-
torial waters, the question then becomes what law is applicable.
Two obvious possibilities exist in foreign law and the general mari-
time law recognized by the United States Supreme Court in
Moragne." The decision to be made between the two is one governed
by choice of law considerations beyond the scope of this comment.
However, an interesting question arises if one determines that
foreign law applies: can such foreign law be supplemented by the
general maritime law recognized as applicable in Moragne? It is
accepted that if a general maritime law exists it is applicable every-
where unless supplanted by statute. Unless foreign law bars its
application, the general maritime law should be available to supple-
ment recovery, especially in view of the long-established premise
that in admiralty proceedings it is more blessed to give than to
withhold. 7 Perhaps the more intriguing questions are raised if one
determines that DOHSA is applicable within foreign territorial
waters. A possible postulate is that either foreign law or the general
64. See text at note 45, supra.
65. Ball, supra note 45, at 389.
66. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970).
67. This premise found its beginning over 100 years ago when Mr. Chief Justice
Chase, sitting on the circuit in The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909, 910 (No. 12,578) (C.C. Md.
1865), wrote: "[Clertainly it better becomes the humane and liberal character of pro-
ceedings in admiralty to give than to withhold the remedy, when not required to
withhold it by established and inflexible rules." The doctrine has been cited subse-
quently by the courts on numerous occasions, the most recent and relevant of which
are in Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1978), Sea-Land Services,
Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573, 583 (1974), and Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398
U.S. 375, 387 (1970).
[Vol. 411224
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maritime law of Moragne can supplement recovery under DOHSA.
The factors to consider in determining whether foreign law is to
supplement the recovery provided by DOHSA are much the same as
previously discussed. 8 Although the factors remain relevant, the
context has changed. At issue is application of foreign law to supple-
ment recovery under DOHSA within the territorial waters of that
foreign sovereign. Viewed in this context and recognizing comity as
an additional factor, a different result than that reached earlier
could be supported. On first glance one might presume that the
United States Supreme Court with its decision in Mobil Oil Corp. v.
Higginbotham9 answered the question of whether general maritime
law can supplement DOHSA; however, this is not the case. The Hig-
ginbotham Court pronounced DOHSA to be Congress's considered
opinion on a variety of subjects such as beneficiaries and con-
tributory negligence, but did not include within the list DOHSA's
applicability within foreign territorial waters. The rationale used
by the Court in holding that general maritime law cannot be used to
supplement DOHSA is based on the premise that Congress had
spoken to the question raised in Higginbotham by passing DOHSA
and that when Congress has spoken directly to a question, the
courts are not free to supplement the Act to such an extent as to
render the Act meaningless. Given the ambiguity of the statute and
its legislative history, it seems unlikely that Congress has spoken
directly to the question at hand. Therefore, the sustaining rationale
of the Higginbotham decision is not present. Additionally, if federal
courts apply DOHSA within foreign territorial waters, such applica-
tion arguably is not mandated by Congress, but instead constitutes
a judicial choice among possible alternatives. The decision will be
the courts' and not Congress's answer to the question; in an area
wherein Congress has not spoken directly, the courts should be free
to fashion their answer without the limitation of the Higginbotham
decision. Thus, a solid argument exists that general maritime law
can be used to supplement recovery when DOHSA is applied by the
courts within foreign territorial waters. Whether the courts will be
receptive to such an argument, given the spirit of the Higginbotham
decision, remains to be seen."
Rebecca F. Doherty
68. See notes 55-66, supra, and accompanying text.
69. 436 U.S. 618 (1978). The Court held that the general maritime law as recognized
in Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375 (1970), and Sea-Land Services,
Inc. v. Gaudet, 414 U.S. 573 (1974), could not be used to supplement recovery under
DOHSA where Congress has spoken directly to a question. 436 U.S. at 625.
70. 436 U.S. at 625.
71. The question is not settled; consequently, the courts will be called upon to
make decisions based in part upon policy considerations. It is urged that no pressing
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social policy will be served by extending DOHSA into the territorial waters of another
sovereign. DOHSA is not necessary in order to insure an adequate remedy, as the
general maritime law recognized by Moragne is available and offers recovery broader
than that of DOHSA. Also, uniformity of application would not be served by extending
DOHSA into foreign territorial waters. DOHSA by its own terms does not apply
within the coastal waters of the individual states, in deference to their sovereignty;
therefore, uniform application suggests that DOHSA should not apply within the
coastal waters of foreign states, also in deference to their sovereignty. Comity would
be served by the court's exercising restraint and by not applying DOHSA within the
coastal waters of foreign sovereigns.
